

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JIDDA 03081 01 OF 02 231131Z

10

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

----- 028359

R 230808Z JUL 73

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4442

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY SANAA

USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 JIDDA 3081

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF FOR ISA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, JO, SA, YE, EG

SUBJ: ARMS AID FOR YEMEN

REF: A. STATE 138643; B. SANAA 1325; C. JIDDA 2750;
D. JIDDA 3012

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR ASKED PRINCE SULTAN IF HE AWARE
PLANNING UNDER WAY BETWEEN YAR AND GOJ FOR DELIVERY
AMMUNITION TO NORTH YEMEN. SULTAN SAID JORDANIANS HAD
ASKED CONCERNING OVERFLIGHTS FOR TWO PLANES CARRYING
AMMUNITION AND HE HAD AGREED, RECOMMENDING THEY LAND
IN JIDDA FOR REFUELING EN ROUTE. AMB SAID YAR NEED
FOR AMMUNITION SEEMED WHOLLY VALID IN VIEW EXPANDED
ACTIVITY PDRY GUERRILLA GROUPS. SULTAN ASKED ABOUT
PROGRESS WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION USMTM-QABBANI PLAN FOR
RE-EQUIPPING YAR ARMY AND AMB ASSURED HIM URGENT ATTENTION
BEING GIVEN. SULTAN SUGGESTED EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE
ENCOURAGED HELP WITH YAR DEFENSE VIEW FACT THEIR ARMS OF
SAME ORIGIN AS NORTH YEMENIS'. AMB SPEAKING PERSONALLY
SAID WE FAVORED SUCH REGIONAL ENDEAVORS THROUGH DECISION
MUST LIE WITH YARG. IN GENERAL SULTAN TOOK POSITIVE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JIDDA 03081 01 OF 02 231131Z

FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO YAR ARMS PROBLEMS THROUGH THERE

TELLTALE INDICATORS SAUDIS HOPE KEEP HAND ON CONTROL
VALVE OF ARMS FLOW TO YEMENIS. END SUMMARY.

1. COMMENCED DISCUSSION THIS TOPIC WITH PRINCE SULTAN
BY SAYING WISHED BE CERTAIN HE HAD BEEN INFORMED RE
PLANNING NOW UNDERWAY BETWEEN YAR AND GOJ FOR LATTER TO
DELIVER ON EMERGENCY BASIS CERTAIN ITEMS AMMUNITION,
SMALL ARMS, AND OTHER EQUIPMENT URGENTLY REQUIRED BY
NORTH YEMENIS MEET SHARPLY INCREASED THREAT TO THEIR
SECURITY. I SAID WE HAD URGED BOTH YEMENIS AND JORDANIANS
TO KEEP SAG INFORMED OF THEIR PLANS. I ASKED HRH IF IN
FACT HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED, SINCE IT CLEARLY OUR IMPRESSION
YEMENIS AND JORANIANS HAD BEEN ENDEAVORING, THROUGH
SAUDI REPS, TO LET SAG KNOW WHAT THEY WERE DOING.

2. SULTAN REPLIED HE WAS AWARE IN GENERAL WAY.
JORDANIANS HAD BEEN IN CONTACT SAG WITH REQUEST FOR ONE
OR TWO PLANES CARRYING AMMUNITION TO LAND IN JIZAN FOR
REFUELING BEFORE PROCEEDING ON TO SANAA. SULTAN CLAIMED
HIS ONLY PROBLEM WITH THIS WAS THAT JIZAN WAS SHORT ON
AIRCRAFT FUEL AND HE WOULD PREFERE SEE PLANES STOP IN
JIDDA WHERE THEY COULD BE MORE EASILY SERVICED. HE
UNDERSTOOD THAT AIRCRAFT WERE CARRYING "303 OR JARMAL
AMMO", AND HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER MILITARY OR CIVILIAN
JORDANIAN PLANE WOULD BE UTILIZED. (WE UNABLE DETERMINE
WHAT SULTAN MEANT BY JARMAL AMMO.) IN ESSENCE, HOWEVER,
SULTAN SAW NO OBJECTION TO OPERATION, AND SAID IT WAS
IMPOTANT YAR GET WHAT IT NEEDED AND THAT SUPPLIES MOVE
PROMPTLY.

3. TOLD SULTAN I WAS GLAD TO HEAR THIS. WE HAD TAKEN
SAME POSITION WHEN YAR AND JORDANIAN REPS FIRST BROACHED
MATTER WITH US. REQUEST SEEMED TO BE BASED ON URGENT
NEEDS STEMMING FROM RECENT DETERIORATION OF SECURITY
SITUATION IN SOUTHERN PORTION YAR WHERE THERE WAS STEADY
EXPANSION IN NUMBER OF GUERRILLA GROUPS FROM PDRY WHO
ROAMING COUNTRYSIDE. YAR HAD NO MEANS PREVENT SUCH
ACTIVITIES EXCEPT BY DETAILING SMALL UNITS OF REGULAR
ARMY TRACK DOWN AND DESTROY GUERRILLA ELEMENTS. THIS
LED NECESSARITY TO EXCESSIVE USE OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JIDDA 03081 01 OF 02 231131Z

AS YAR TROOPS STRUCK AT ILLUSIVE TARGETS, WE COULD WELL
UNDERSTAND THEREFORE YEMENIS SEARCHING OUT EVERY POSSIBLE
SOURCE FOR PROMTP ACQUISITION OF NEEDED ARMS. I WAS NOT
IN POSITION TELL SULTAN PRECISELY WHO WOULD BEAR COST OF
ARMS, BUT IN ANY CASE SUMS OF MONEY WOULD NOT BE VERY
GREAT. US WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE PUTTING UP ANY OF NEEDED
FINANCING.

4. SULTAN INDICATED AGAIN HE SAW NO OBJECTION AND WENT ON AT ONCE TO INQUIRE WHETHER I HAD ANY WORD FOR HIM AS TO USG VIEW ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN FOR RE-EQUIPPING AND TRAINING YAR ARMY (REFTEL C). I TOLD SULTAN I HAD PLACED BEFORE DEPT OF DEFENSE CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY COMBINED USMTM-QABBANI CONSULTATION GROUP AND HAD ASKED THAT REPLY BE EXPEDITED. WASHINGTON WAS WELL AWARE OF HIS URGENT DESIRE FOR ANSWER ON THIS MATTER AND WAS, I FELT SURE, GIVING MATTER FULL AND URGENT ATTENTION. REMARKED TO SULTAN THAT WE HAD RECEIVED LIST FROM USMTM OF ITEMS AGREED UPON IN JOINT SAUDI-US STUDY GROUP FOR DEVELOPMENT OF YEMEN AIR FORCE (REFTEL D). HOWEVER, WHAT WE HAD SO FAR WAS SIMPLY A LIST OF EQUIPMENT AND A GOOD DEAL OF ADDITIONAL THOUGHT NEEDED TO BE APPLIED BEFORE WE HAD WORKED OUT SENSIBLE OVERALL PLAN FOR ASSISTING YEMENIS.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DOD.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 JIDDA 03081 02 OF 02 231137Z

10

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

----- 028365

R 230808Z JUL 73

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4443

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY SANAA

USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 JIDDA 3081

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF FOR ISA

5. SULTAN DECLARED THAT HE THOUGHT TRAINING FOR YEMENIS IN F-5A RPT F-5A SHOULD BEGIN AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, WHETHER IN SAUDI ARABIA, US, PAKISTAN, OR IRAN. AS FAR AS TRAINING FOR YAR ARMY CONCERNED, PERHAPS THIS COULD

BEST BE UNDERTAKEN IN JORDAN. SULTAN MENTIONED AGAIN HIS DESIRE FOR OUR THOUGHTS ON FUNDING.

6. LATER IN CONVERSATION SULTAN MENTIONED ANOTHER IDEA WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE MILITARY AID TO YEMEN TO WHICH HE SAID HE HAD BEEN GIVING SOME CONSIDERATION: EGYPT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO PLAY DIRECT ACTIVE ROLE IN YAR REARMING SINCE EGYPTIANS HAVE ARMS LARGELY OF SAME ORIGINS AS YEMENIS. ACCORDINGLY THEY SHOULD BE ABLE SUPPLY YAR READILY WITH SPARE PARTS WHICH WOULD HELP GET BACK INTO ACTION AIRCRAFT YAR PRESENTLY HAS ON HAND. EGYPTIANS PRESUMABLY HAVE PERSONNEL FAMILIAR WITH PRESENT YAR WEAPONS WHO COULD BE USED FOR TRAINING YEMENIS. MOREOVER, PERHAPS GOE WOULD BE WILLING RELEASE QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT AS GIFTS OR FOR SALE TO YAR. SULTAN ASKED IF I SAW ANY OBJECTION TO THIS.

7. REPLIED THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY I COULD SEE NO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JIDDA 03081 02 OF 02 231137Z

OBJECTION WHATSOEVER. ONE OF STRONGEST ASPECTS OF YAR'S PRESENT SITUATION IS ITS GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL ARAB COUNTRIES, WHEREAS PDYR IS INCREASINGLY ISOLATED EXCEPT FOR SOME TIES WITH IRAQ. IN GENERAL WE FAVORED REGIONAL ENDEAVORS TO STRENGTHEN YAR'S DEFENSES AND, FOR REASONS SULTAN HAD MENTIONED, EGYPTIANS WERE PERHAPS AS WELL QUALIFIED AS ANYONE TO EXTEND HELP. HOWEVER, QUESTION WAS OF COURSE BASICALLY ONE FOR YARG ITSELF TO DECIDE. YEMENI LEADERS MIGHT BE INFLUENCED IN THEIR RESPONSE BY MEMORIES OF RATHER LONG AND INTENSIVE EXPOSURE TO LARGE NUMBERS OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS AND TRAINERS IN RECENT PAST. IF THEY HAD RESERVATIONS ON SUCH GROUNDS, IT WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE.

8. SULTAN NODDED AND DECLARED HE HAD CONSIDERED THIS ASPECT OF SITUATION. PERHAPS ONE WAY MAKE EGYPTIAN EQUIPMENT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO YAR WOULD BE FOR SAUDIS TO PURCHASE IT AND PASS IT ON TO YEMENIS SO LATTER WOULD NOT FEEL OBLIGATED TO GOE. SULTAN SAID HE REALIZED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS HIS OFFICERS HAD BEEN DISCUSSING WITH USMTM WERE NECESSARILY LONG RANGE AND MIGHT TAKE COUPLE OF YEARS COME TO FRUITION. INTERIM SUPPLIES PROVIDED BY EGYPT COULD DO A GREAT DEAL BOOST YAR MORALE, GET ITS FORCES BACK IN SHAPE TO FACE STEADILY GROWING THREAT FROM COMMUNIST SOUTH. GOE WOULD HAVE TO WEIGH FOR ITSELF RISKS IN ITS RELATIONS WITH USSR WHICH ACTIVE ROLE IN SUPPORT OF YAR COULD IMPLY.

9. COMMENT: TAKEN IN TOTO, FOREGOING REPRESENTS POSITIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BY SAG TO YAR AREMS

PROBLEMS. SULTAN SEEMED FLEXIBLE, WILLING SEE OTHERS
PLAY ACTIVE ROLE, READY TO APPROVE ANY METHOD THAT WOULD
GET JOB DONE. AT SAME TIME REFERENCES TO DESIRABILITY
OF JORDANIAN PLANES STOPPING IN JIDDA OR POSSIBILITY SAG
PURCHASING EXCESS EGYPTIAN EQUIPMENT FOR DELIVERY TO YAR
CONSTITUTE TELLTALE SIGNS SAUDIS' INCLINATION KEEP HAND
IN SOME FASHION ON CONTROL VALVE OF ARMS FLOW TO YAR
FROM WHATEVER SOURCE.
THACHER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DOD.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JIDDA 03081 02 OF 02 231137Z

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY EQUIPMENT, ARMS, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ARMED FORCES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 JUL 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: worrelsw
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973JIDDA03081
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P750007-1872
From: JIDDA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730715/aaaaakwe.tel
Line Count: 240
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 73 STATE 138643, 73 SAMAA 1325, 73 JIDDA 3012
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: worrelsw
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 DEC 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <10-Dec-2001 by martinml>; APPROVED <26 FEB 2002 by worrelsw>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ARMS AID FOR YEMEN
TAGS: MASS, JO, SA, YE, US
To: n/a
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005